

The Case of

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SHIPMONY

Briefly Discoursed,

ACCORDING TO THE
Grounds of Law, Policie,
and Conscience.

AND
MOST HUMBL Y
presented to the Censure and
Correction of the High Court
of PARLIAMENT,
Nov. 3. 1640.



Printed *Ann. Dom.* 1640.

SHIP MONEY

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THE
Case of SHIP-MONEY
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GR E A T Fires happening
in Townes or Cities, are
sometimes the cause that
other contiguous houses
are spoyld and demolisht,
besides those which the flame it selfe cea-
zes: So now, in the case of Shipmony, not
onely the judgement it selfe which hath
beene given against the subject, doth make
a great gap and breach in the rights and
Franchises of England, but the arguments
and pleadings also, which conduced to
that judgement, have extended the mis-
chiefe further, and scarce left any thing
unviolated. Such strange contradi ction
there hath beene amongst the pleaders,
and dissent amongst the Judges, even in
A 2 those

those Lawes which are most fundamentall, that we are left in a more confused uncertainty of our highest priviledges, and those customs which are most essentiall to Freedome then we were before. To introduce the legality of the Ship-scoot, such a Prerogative hath been maintained, as destroyes all other Law, and is incompatible with popular liberty : and such art hath beene used to deny, traverse, avoid, or frustrate the true force or meaning of all our Lawes and Charters, that if wee grant Ship-money upon these grounds, with Ship-money we grant all besides. To remove therefore this uncertainty, which is the mother of all injustice, confusion, and publike dissention, it is most requisite that this grand Councell and Treshault Court (of which none ought to thinke dishonourably) would take these *Ardna Regni*, these weighty and dangerous difficulties, into serious debate, and solemnly end that strife, which no other place of Judicature can so effectually extinguish.

That the King ought to have aid of his subjects in time of danger, and common aid in case of common danger, is laid down for a ground, and agreed upon by all sides, But about this aid there remaines much variety and contrariety of opinion amongst the greatest Sages of our Law ; and the principall points

points therein controverted are these foure :
 First, by what Law the King may compell
 aid. Secondly, when it is to be levied.
 Thirdly, how it is to be levied. Fourthly,
 what kinde of aid it must be.

Some of the Judges argue from the
 Law of Nature, that since the King is head,
 and bound to protect, therefore he must have
 wherewithall to protect : but this proves on-
 ly that which no man denies. The next Law
 insisted upon is Prerogative ; but it is not
 punctually explained what Prerogative, whe-
 ther the Prerogative naturall of all Kings, or
 the Prerogative legall of the Kings of *Eng-
 land*. Some of the Judges urge, that by Law
 there is naturall allegiance due to the King
 from the subject ; and it doth not stand with
 that allygeance that the Princes cannot com-
 pell aid, but must require the common con-
 sent therein. Others presse, that the Law hath
 fetled a property of goods in the subject, and
 it doth not stand with that property, that the
 King may demand them without consent.
 Some take it for granted, that by Royall Pre-
 rogative, as it is part of the Lawes of *Eng-
 land*, the King may charge the Nation with-
 out publike consent, and therefore it being
 part of the Law, it is no invasion upon
 Law. Others take it for granted, that to le-
 vie money without consent is unjust, and

that the Kings prerogative cannot extend to any unjust thing: So many contrary points of warre doe our Trumpets sound at once, and in such confusion doe our Judges leave us, whilst either side takes that for granted, which by the other is utterly denied. By these grounds Royall prerogative, and popular liberty may seeme things irreconcilable; though indeed they are not; neither doth either side in words affirme so much, though their proofes bee so contradictory. King *Charles* his maxime is, that the peoples liberty strenghtens the Kings prerogative, and the Kings prerogative is to maintain the peoples liberty; and by this it seemes that both are compatible, and that prerogative is the more subordinate of the two. The Kings words also since have beene upon another occasion, That he ever intended his people should enjoy property of goods, and liberty of persons, holding no King so great, as he that was King of a rich and free people: and if they had not property of goods, and liberty of persons, they could bee neither rich nor free. Here we see, that the liberty of the subject is a thing which makes a King great; and that the Kings prerogative hath only for its ends to maintain the peoples liberty. Wherefore it is manifest, that in nature there is more favour due to the liberty of the subject, then to the

the Prerogative of the King, since the one is ordained onely for the preservation of the other; and then to salve these knots, our dispute must be, what prerogative the peoples good and profit will beare, not what liberty the Kings absolutenesse or prorogative may admit. and in this dispute it is more just that we appeale to written Lawes, than to the breasts of Kings themselves. For we know Nationall Lawes are made by consent of Prince and people both, and so cannot bee conceived to be prejudiciall to either side; but where the meere will of the Prince is Law, or where some few Ministers of his may alleage what they will for Law in his behalfe, no mediocrity or justice is to be expected: we all know that no slave or villaine can be subjected to more miserable bondage than to be left meerly to his Lords absolute discretion: and we all see that the thraldome of such is most grievous, which have no bounds set to their Lord discretion. Let us then see what *Fortescue* writes, not regard what Court-dependants doe interpret, and his words are, fol. 84. cap. 36. *Rex Anglia nec per se, nec per suos Ministros Tollagia subsidia, aut quavis onera alia imponit legis suis, aut leges eorum mutat, aut nova condit sine concessione vel assensu totius regni sui in Parlamento suo expresso.* These words are full and generall, and

and plain, and in direct affirmance of the ancient Law and usage of *England*, and it is not sufficient for the Kings Counsell to say, that these words extend not to Ship-money : for if there were any doubt, the interpretation ought rather to favour liberty than Prerogative.

It is not sufficient for Judge *Jones* to say, that it is *proprium quarto modo* to a King, and an inseparable naturall Prerogative of the Crowne to raise monies without assent, unless he first prove that such Prerogative be good and profitable for the people, and such as the people cannot subsist at all without it : nay, such as no Nation can subsist without it. This word Prerogative hath divers acceptations : sometimes it is taken for the altitude of Honour, sometimes for the latitude of Power. So we say the Prerogative of an Emperour is greater than that of a King ; and that of a King greater than that of a Duke, or petty Potentate : and yet of Kings we say that the King of *Denmark* hath not so great a Prerogative as the King of *England*, nor the King of *England* as the King of *France*, &c. For here though their honour and title be the same, yet their power is not. Sometimes Prerogative signifies as much as Sovereignty ; and in this generall consideration wee say, that all supreme Commanders are equal :
and

and that they all have this essentiall inseparable Prerogative, that their power ought to be ample enough for their perfection, and good of the people, and no ampler : because the supream of all humane Lawes is *salus populi*. To this Law all Lawes almost stoope ; God dispences with many of his Lawes, rather than *salus populi* shall bee endangered ; and that iron-law, which we call necessity it selfe, is but subservient to this Law : for rather then a Nation shall perish, any thing shall be held necessary, and legall by necessity : But to come to the Prerogative of *England*, and to speeke of it in generall, and compatively ; we say it is a harmonious compofure of policie, scarce to be paralleled in all the world, it is neither so boundlesse as to opresse the people in unjust things, nor so strait as to disable the King in just things : by the true fundamental constitutions of *England*, the beame hangs even between the King and the Subject : the Kings power doth not tread under foot the peoples liberty ; nor the peoples liberty the Kings power. All other Countries almost in Christendome, differ from us in this module of policie : some, but very few, allow a greater spheare of Sovereignty to their Princes ; but for the most part now adayes the world is given to republites, or to condi-

tionate and restrained forms of government : howsoever we ought not to condemne any Nation as unjust herein, though differing from us ; for though they seem perhaps very unpolitick, yet it is hard to be affirmed that God and Nature ever ordained the same method of rule, or scope of loyalty to all States whatsoever : besides, what dislike soever we take at other regiments, yet except it be in very great excesses or defects, we must not thinke change alwayes necessary, since custome in those great and generall points obtains the force of another nature, & nature is not to be changed. Divines of late have beene much to blame here in preaching one universall forme of government, as necessary to all Nations, and that not the moderate & equall neither, but such as ascribes all to Sovereignty, nothing at all to popular liberty : Some Lawyers also and Statesmen have deserved as ill of late, partly by suggesting that our English Laws are too injurious to our King, and partly by informing, that this King is more limited by Law then his Progenitors were, and that till he be as the King of *France* is, *Rex Absolutum*, he is but a subject to his subjects, and as a Minor under the command of guardians: but what hath ensued out of the Kings jealousy of his subject, and overstraining his Prerogative ? nothing but irreparable losse,

losse and mischief both to King and Commonwealth : and indeed the often and great infections and insurrections which have hapned of late, almost all over Europe, may suffice to warn all wise Princes, not to overstraine their Prerogatives too high ; not to give eare to such Counsellors as some of our Judges are, who affirme our Kings Prerogative to be in all points unalterable, and by consequence not depending upon Law at all: by another exception of this word Prerogative in *England*, we mean such Law here established, as gives the King such and such preheminences and priviledges before any subject ; such as are not essentiall to royalty, but may bee annulled by the same power by which they were created. That a King shall defend and maintaine his subjectes, is a duty belonging to the Office, not a priviledge belonging to the Crowne of a King ; this obligation nature layes upon him, and no other power can dissolve it. Also that subjects shall afford aid, and joine with their Princes in common defence, is a duty arising from the allegiance of the people, and not an honor redounding only to the Prince; nature's law hath made this a tie, not to be changed or infringed : for that which is annexed by an eternall superiour power cannot be made severable by a temporall humane power :

but that such an Emperour, King or Potentate, shall have such or such aid, and compell it by such or such meanes, at such or such times, as to the particular modes and circumstances of his aid, particular municipall Lawes must direct, and these it would bee as dangerous to alter, as it is absurd to hold unalterable. In a Parliament held by King James, it was debated, whether or no Tenures in *Capite*, and allowance of Purveyors might bee repealed and divided from the Crowne, and it was held that by no Act or statute they could bee taken away, because they were naturally inherent to the Crowne.

This resolution seemes very strange to me, since the Law of Tenures and Purveyors is not so naturall and essentiall to Monarchy, that it cannot, or may not subsist without it. For if in other Countries it be held a meere politicall way, perhaps an inconvenient thing, then why may not the Princes Royalty, and the peoples safety be preserved intire without it in England: And if so, then why shall not the same authority have vigor to repeal it, which wanted not vigor to enforce it. I cannot conceive that the Parliament herein reflected upon what was formall in Law to be done, but rather upon what was convenient: such *insignia suprema, Majestatis*

jestatis as these; I did not hold it fit to be^c dismembred from the Crowne in policy, I onely hold it a thing possible in law, nay though the King enjoyes diverse such like prerogatives more, as *I. Jones* thinks; then any Prince in Christendome, yet should not I desire or advise to plucke away one the least Flower out of the Regall Garland, nor would it be (perhaps) Profitable for the State, to suffer the least diminution thereof. Wee know also, that in England the Prerogative hath beene bound in many cases, by Statute-law, and restrained of diverse such priviledges, as were not essentiall, but meereley politicall. *Nullum tempus occurrit Regi*: this was one of the English Royalties, and very beneficiall many wayes, yet wee know this is in diverse cases limited by Act of Parliament, and that very justly, as *I. Hutton* argues, The great and ancient Tax of Dangel, it was a Subsidue taken by the Kings of England; for the common defence of the Kingdome, yet this was first released by King *Stephen*, and after abolished for ever by the statutes of *Edward* the first: and there is no reason why an Act of Parliament should not bee as valid in our case as it was in that. Wherefore it is to be admired, that *J. Jones* should account this way of aid by ship-money, or any other, without publike consent, to bee *Pro-*

primum quarto modo to the Kings of England, and since irrepealable, since our Kings have in all ages done such noble acts without it; and not onely defended, but also enlarged their Dominions. The last kinde of accepti-
on of this word Prerogative is improper. Thus to pardon malefactors, to dispence with penall Lawes, to grant *Non obstantes*, to be free from attainders, to call or discontinue, to prorogue or dissolve Parliaments, &c. are not truly and properly called Prerogatives: these all in some sense may be called Munities, or indemnities belonging to the sacred person of the King, as he is inviolable, and subject to no force & compulsion of any other, And as he is the soule of Law, in whose power alone it is to execute Law, and yet not to be constrained thereto. To grant a pardon for some malefactors for some crimes, may perhaps be as heynous as to commit them; and that which drawes a guilt upon the King, cannot be said to be his privilege. If it might be tearmed a Royalty, that the King is not questionable, or punishable, or to be forced to such acts as tend to the obstruction of justice, it might as well be so tearmed in acts tending to the transgression of Law: for in both he is alike free from any coercive or vindicative force. For it is out of necessity, not honour or benefir,
that

that the King hath a freedome from constraint, or restraint in these cases ; and that this freedome is inseparable, because no force can be used but by superiours or equals, and he which hath either superiours or equall, is no King. If a King should shut up the Courts of ordinary Justice, & prohibit all pleadings and proceedings between man and man, and refuse to authorize Judges for the determining of suits, hee would bee held to doe a most unkingly thing : and yet this may be as truly called a Prerogative, as to disuse and dissolve Parliaments. But it may be objected, that the King, besides such negative privilege and freedome from force, hath also a positive and siezing subjects lands, &c. in divers cases, as in making Bulwarks upon any mans land for common defence, &c. To this it may be answered, That to such power the King is not intituled by his Prerogative, nor is it any benefit to him, necessity herein is his only warrant : for either this private inconvenience must happen, or a publike ruine follow ; and in nature the lesse and private evil is to be chosen : and here the party trespasssed enjoys safety by it, and shall after receive satisfaction for his detriment. Were there such apparent unavoidable necessity in the Ship-scop, that either that course must be taken, or the community inevitably perish,

prieth, or where the King wholly disinterested in point of profit, or were there hope of restitution; it could not be without consent, and so not against Law. So then, for ought that is yet alleaged, Prerogative, except that which is essentiall to all Kings, without which they cannot bee Kings, is alterable, and it ought to be deduced out of the written and knowne Lawes of the Kingdome, and Law is not to be inferred out of that: we ought not to presume a Prerogative, & thence conclude it a Law, but we ought not to cite the Law, and thence prove it to be Prerogative. To descend then to our owne Lawes, yet there our Judges vary too. What the Common Law was in this point is doubted by some; and some say if the Common Law did allow the King such a Prerogative, to lay a generall charge without consent, then Statutes cannot alter it.

Some doe not accept against the force of Statute Law, but avoid our particular Statutes by divers severall evasive answers. Some say our Great Charter was but a grant of the King, extorted by force; some except against the 25. of *Ed. 1.* because there is *salvo* in it: some against the 34. of *Ed. 1.* as made in the Kings absence; some object against the 14. of *Ed. 3.* as if it were temporary, and because it is not particularly reited in the Petition of Right:

Right : and the common evasion of all beneficiall Statutes, & of the Petition of right, is, that they binde the King from imposing pecuniary charges for the replenishing of his owne coffers, but not from imposing such personall services, as this Ship-scot is, in time of danger and necessity. *J. Crawly* maintaines this Ship-scot to be good by Prerogative at the Common Law, and not to be altered by Statute. What the Common Law was, this Court can best determine, but it is obvious to all men, that no Prerogative can be at the Common Law, but it had some beginning, and that must be from either King or Subject, or both : and in this, it is not superiour to our Statute Law, and by consequence not unalterable. The Medes and Persians had a Law, that no Law once past, should ever be repealed ; but doubtlesse this Law being repealed first, all others might after suffer the same alteration, and it is most absurd to think that this Law might not be repealed by the same authority by which it was at first enacted. *J. Jones* sayes, our Statutes restraine tollages in generall termes, and cites divers cases, that a speciall interest shall not passe from the King, but in speciall terms : but his cases are put of private grantees, over whom the King ought to retaine a great preheminence : but the Law is, that where the whole

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state in grantee, that grant shall have the force of a Statute, because it is *pro bono publico*, and because the whole State is in value and dignity as much to be preferred before the King, as the King is before any private grantee. But J. Jones sayes further, if generall words shall extend to these extraordinary publike levies, then they may as well extend to his ordinary private rights & intradoes, & so cut off *Aide pur faire filz Chivalier, &c.* The contrary hereof is manifest, for the intent of all our Statutes is to defend the subject against such publike tollages and impositions, as every man is equally liable to, and as are not due in Law otherwise, or recoverable by ordinary action. Now these aids, &c. and the Kings ordinary revenues and services, are not such as are due from every man, but recoverable by ordinary action. Howsoever in all these doubts the Law would now be made cleare, and not onely the vertue of Statutes in generall, but also the true meaning of our particular Charters would be vindicated from these exceptions.

2 I come now to our second difficulty, when a publike charge may be laid. Here the favourers of Ship-money yet agree, that the King may not charge the subject meerly to fill his owne coffers; or annually, or when he will invade a forraigne enemy, or when
 Pirates

Pirates rob, or burn Townes and Burroughs, for these ordinary defence is sufficient : and when there is imminent and eminent danger of publike invasion, we agree that the subject may be charged.

The *quare* then is, whether the King bee sole Judge of the danger, and of the remedy, or rather whether he be so sole Judge, that his meere affirmation and notification of a danger foreseene by him at a distance, or pretended onely to be foreseene, shall be so unquestionable, that he may charge the Kingdome thereupon at his discretion, though they assent not, nor apprehend the danger as it is forewarned. J. Crooke proves the contrary thus : If danger, sayes he, be far distant, if it be in report only of French Armadoes, and Spanish preparations, &c. though it be certaine, and not pretensive, yet Parliamentary aid may be speedy enough : and if it be imminent, then this way of Ship-scut will not be speedy enough ; for either the designe is really to have new Ships built, and that will require longer time than a Parliament ; or else money onely is aimed at, whereby to arme other Ships, and for this the Law hath provided a more expedite way than by Ship-scut, in case of imminent danger.

If then the King have power to presse all mens persons and Ships, and all are bound

exponere se, & sua, and to serve *propria sumptibus*, when imminent danger is, and this defence hath alwayes beene held effectually enough, it is consequent, that if he be not destitute of competent aid in present distresses, he cannot pretend a greater necessity in dangers more remote, when they are but suspected, or perhaps pretended onely.

My Lord *Bramston* sayes here, that there is a necessity of preventing a necessity : and that the Sea is part of the Kingdome, and therefore of necessity to be guarded as the Kingdome. The answer is, That the safety of the Kingdome does not necessarily depend upon the Ship-scot, and so this necessity being removed, the necessity grounded upon this, falls off of it selfe. For if the Kingdome may escape ruine at hand when it is a storme, without Ship-money, it may much more escape it afar off being but a cloud. But grant the Sea to be a part of the Kingdome to some purposes; yet how is it a part essentiall, or equally valuable; or how does it appeare that the fate of the Land depends wholly upon the dominion of the Sea? *France* subsists now without the regiment of the Sea, and why may not we as well want the same? If *England* quite spend it selfe, and poure out all its treasure to preserve the Seigniorie of the Seas, it is not certaine to exceed the Navall

vall force of *France, Spaine, Holland, &c.* And if it content it selfe with its ancient strength of shipping, it may remaine as safe as it hath formerly done. Nay, I cannot see that either necessity of ruine, or necessity of dishonour can be truly pretended out of this, that *France, Spaine, Holland, &c.* are too potent at Sea for us.

The dominion of the Seas may be considered as a meer right, or as an honour, or as a profit to us. As a right, it is a theame fitter for schollers to whet their wits upon, then for Christians to fight and spill bloud about : and since it doth not manifestly appeare how or when it was first purchased, or by what Law conveyed to us, we take notice of it only as matter of wit and disputation. As it is an honour to be masters of the Sea, and to make others strike saile to us as they passe ; its a glory fitter for women and children to wonder at, then for States-men to contend about. It may bee compared to a chaplet of flowers, not to a diadem of gold : but as it is a profit to us to fence and inclose the Sea, that our neighbours shall not surprize us unawares ; its matter of moment, yet it concernes us but as it doth other Nations : by too insolent contestations hereupon, wee may provoke God, and dishonour our selves : we may more probably incense our friends,

then quell our enemies, we may make the land a slave to the sea, rather than the sea a servant to the land; but I pray Master *Selden* to pardon me for this transition, and I returne my matter: if the Kingdome could not possibly subsist without Ship-money in such a danger, yet there is no necessity that the King should be so sole Judge of that danger, as that he may judge therein contrary to the opinion, and perhaps, knowledge of other men. I allow the King to be supream, and consequently sole Judge in all cases whatsoever, as to the right, and as to the diffusion of Judgement; but as to the exercise and restraint of judgement, he is not, nor ought not to be accounted sole Judge. In matters of Law the King must create Judges, and swear them to judge uprightly and impartially, and for the subject against himselfe, if Law so require, yea, though he be of contrary judgement himselfe, and by his Letters sollicite the contrary. The Kings power is as the digestive faculty in nature, all parts of the body contribute heat to it for their owne benefit, that they may receive backe againe from it a better concocted and prepared supply of nourishment, as it is their office to contribute, so it is the stomacks to distribute.

And questionlesse sole judgement in matters of State, does no otherwise belong to

to the King, then in matters of Law, or points of Theologie. Besides as sole judgement is here ascribed to the King, he may affirme dangers to be foreseene when he will, and of what nature he will : If he say onely, *Datum est nobis intelli*, as he does in his Writ, &c. To his sole indisputable judgement it is left to lay charges as often and as great as he pleases. And by this meanes if he regard not his word more than his profit, he may in one yeare draine all the Kingdome of all its treasure, and leave us the most despicable slaves in the whole world.

It is ridiculous also to alleage, as J. Jones does, that it is contrary to presumption of Law to suspect falsity in the King : for if Law presume that the King will not falsly pretend danger to vex his subjects, of his owne meere motion, yet no Law, nor reason, nor policy will presume, that the King may not be induced by mis-information to grieve the people without cause. The Sunne is not more visible than this truth, our best Kings, King Charles, King James, Queene Elizabeth, and all the whole ascending line, have done undue illegall things sometimes, contrary to the rights and Franchises of England, being mis-informed, but having consulted with the Judges or States in Parliament, they have all retracted and confessed their error. Nay, there

there is nothing more knowne, or univertally
 affented to than this, that Kings may be bad;
 and it is more probable and naturall, that
 evill may be expected from good Princes,
 than good from bad. Wherefore, since it is
 all one to the State, whether evill proceed
 from the King mediately or immediately,
 out of malice or ignorance: and since wee
 know that of all kinds of government Mo-
 narchicall is the worst, when the Scepter is
 wielded by an unjust and unskillfull Prince,
 though it be the best, when such Princes as
 are not seduceable (a thing most rare) reigne,
 it will be great discretion in us not to desert
 our right in those Lawes which regulate and
 confine Monarchie, meerly out of Law-pre-
 sumption; if we must presume well of our
 Princes, to what purpose are Lawes made:
 and if Lawes are frustrate and absurd, where-
 in doe we differ in condition from the most
 abject of all bond-slaves?

There is no Tyranny more abhorred than
 that which hath a controlling power over all
 Law, and knowes no bounds but its owne
 will: if this be not the utmost of Tyranny,
 the Turks are not more servile than we are:
 and if this be Tyranny, this invention of ship-
 money makes us as servile as the Turks. We
 must of necessity admit, that our Princes are
 not to be mis-led, and then our Lawes are
 needlesse:

needlesse; or that they may be misse-led, and then our Lawes are uselesse. For if they will listen to ill counsell, they may bee mooved to pretend danger causlesly; and by this pretence defeate all our lawes and liberties, and those being defeated, what doth the English holde, but at the Kings meere discretion, wherein doth he excell the Captives condition? if wee shall examine why the Mahometan slaues are more miserably treated, then the Germans, or why the French Pefants are so beggerly, wretched, and bestially used more then the Hollanders; or why the people of Millaine, Naples, Sicily are more oppressed, trampled upon, and inthralled then the Natives of Spayne? there is no other reason will appeare but that they are subject to more immoderate power, and have lesse benefit of law to releeve them.

In nature there is no reason, why the meanest wretches should not enjoy freedom, and demand justice in as ample measure, as those whom law hath provided for: or why Lords which are above law should bee more cruell then those which are more conditionate: yet wee see it is a fatal kind of necessity onely incident to immoderate power, that it must bee immoderately used: and certainly this was well knowne to

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our ancestors, or else they would not have purchased their charters of freedom with so great an expence of blood as they did, and have endured so much so many yeeres rather then to bee betrayd to immoderate power, and prerogative: let us therefore not bee too carelesse of that, which they were so jealous of, but let us look narrowly into the true consequence of this ship-scor, whatsoever the face of it appeare to bee. It is vaine to stop twenty leakes in a ship, and then to leave one open, or to make lawes for the restraynt of loyalty all other wayes, that it may not overflow the estates of the comminalty at pleasure, and yet to leave one great breach for its irruption.

Loyalty.

All our Kings hitherto have beene so circumscribed by law, that they could not command the goods of their subjects at pleasure without common consent: but now if the King be but perswaded to pretend danger, hee is uncontroleable Master of all wee have, one *datum est intelligi*, shal make our *English Statutes* like the politicke hedge of Gote-ham, and no better: I doe not say that this King will falsifie, it is enough that wee all, and all that wee have are at his discretion if hee will falsifie; though vast power bee not *abused*, yet it is a great mischief

mischiefe that it may, and therefore vast power it selfe is justly odious, for divers reasons. First, because it may fall into the hands of ill disposed *Princes*, such as were K. *John*, *Henry* the third, *Edward* the second, *Richard* the second. These all in their times made *England* miserable, and certainly had their power beene more unconfinable they had made it more miserable. The alterations of times doe not depend upon the alteration of the people, but of *Princes*: when *Princes* are good it fares wel with the people when bad ill.

Princes often vary, but the people is alwaies the same in all ages, and capable of smal, or no variations: If *Princes* would endure to heare this trueth it would bee profitable for them, for flatterers alwaies raise jealousies against the people; but the trueth is, the people as the sea, have no turbulent motion of their owne, if *Princes* like the windes doe not raise them into rage. Secondly, vast power if it finde not bad *Princes* it often makes *Princes* bad: It hath often charged *Princes*, as it did *Nero* from good to bad, from bad to worse: but *Vespasian* is the onely noted man which by the Empire was in *melius mutatus*: daily experience teaches this. *Dangelt in England*

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within

changed

within 20. yeares increased unto a four-fold proportion.

Subsidies were in former times seldome granted, and few at a time, now Parliaments are helde by some to be of no other use then to grant them.

The Fox, in Esop, observed that of all the Beasts which had gone to visite the Lyon, few of their foot-steps were to be seene retrorsum, they were all printed adversum. And we find at this day, that it is farre more easie for a King to gaine undue things from the people, then it is for the people to re-gaine its due from a King : This King hath larger Dominions, and hath reigned yet fewer years, and enjoyed quieter times then Queene Elizabeth : And yet his taxations hath beene farre greater, and his Exploits lesse honourable, and the yet^{the} people is still helde in more jealousie.

To deny Shippe-mony which sweeps all, is held and accounted a rejection of naturall Allegiance. I speake not this to render odious the Kings blessed government, God forbid, I hold him one of the mildest, and most gracious of our Kings : And I instance in him the rather, that we may see, what a bewitching thing flattery is, when it touches upon this string of unlimitable power : if this ambition and desire of vast power were not the most naturall, and forcible of all sinnes, Angels in Heaven

Heaven, and man in Paradize had not false by it; but since it is, Princes themselves ought to be the more cautious and cautious of it.

Thirdly, vast power if it neither find nor make bad Princes; yet it makes the good government of good Princes the lesse pleasing, and the lesse effectually, for the common and publicke good: And therefore it is a rule both in Law, and Policy, and Nature, Non recurrendum est ad extraordinaria, in his quæ fieri possunt per ordinaria: All extraordinary aides are horrid to the people, but most especially such as the Ship-scoot is, whereby all liberty is over-throwne, and all Law subjected unto the Kings meer discretion.

Queene Elizabeth in eighty eight was victorious without this Taxation, and I am fully perswaded she was therefore Victorious the rather, because she used it not: Her Arte was to account her subjects hearts as her unfailing Exchequer, and to purchase them by doing legall just things, and this Arte never failed nor deceived her, and in that dismall gust of danger, it was good for her and the whole State, both that she did not relye upon forced aides of money, or the Swords of grieved Souldiers: For this Ship-money nothing can be pretended but necessity, and certainly necessity is ill pretended, when the meere doing of the thing, is as dangerous as that for which it

is done: did not this Ship-scot over-throw all popular Liberty, and so threaten as great a mischief as any Conquest can? And were not the people justly averse from it? Yet meerly for the peoples disaffection to it, it is dangerous to be relied upon in case of great danger.

Wee know Nature teacheth us all, Of two Evils to chuse that which wee thinke the least, though it be not so; therefore if the people apprehend this Remedy as a Thing worse then the Disease, though they be mistaken therein, yet that very mistake may proove fatal.

The Roman Army being harshly treated by the Senators, and their proud Generall, did refuse to charge upon the Enemy, or to resist the charge of the Enemy, they chose rather to be slaughtered by Strangers, then Enthralled by their Country-men. The English also in the late Scottish invasion, by reason of this and many other causes of Discontent, made so faint resistance, that they did almost in a manner Confesse, That they held themselves as miserable already, as the Scots could make them.

Thus wee see there is no necessity of levying Ship-money, there is rather necessity of Repealing it: And we see that presumption of Law doth not abet this Necessity, but rather crosse

croffe it. And whereas I. Iones further saith,
That the Kings Majesty hath no benefit by
Ship-money, and therefore presumption is
the stronger, that the King will not take it
causelessly. We may answer: The Ship money
is a very great benefit unto the King: For if not
immediatly, yet mediately it is become a Re-
venew, inasmuch as by this Addition of other
Revenues of the Crowne, mays, and Tunnage
and Poundage, which were not designed on-
ly for ordinary Expences, but for extraordi-
nary employments, and publicke Charges also,
are now become discharged of that tie, and the
Common-Wealth hath quite lost all its intrest
and property in them. In point of benefit
therefore it is all one to the Kings Majesty, and
in point of burthen, it is all one to the Sub-
ject, whether Ship-money be accounted of as
part of the Kings annuall Rents, or no; since
by it his-rents are enlarged: And as to the Sub-
ject there is no obligation, that this Levy shal
not hereafter incorporate with the rest of the
Kings Majesties Intradoes, and be swallowed
up as Tunnage and Poundage now are. Thus
we see what the Necessity is, and presumption
of Law, which was so much insisted upon;
and yet for a further confutation of both;
Time, the mother of Truth, hath now given us
more light. Now that great danger which was
pretended so many yeares together for the
ne-

necessity of raising so great supplies of treasure, is a small cloud blown over, making it apparant that Kings may bee mis informed; and by mis information take Molehills for Mountaines, and cast heavie burthens upon their subjects.

3.

But I come now to my third Difficulty, how a publick charge is to be laid upon the kingdome. The law runs generally, that in England no Tollage or pecuniary charge may bee imposed *Forſque per common aſſent de tout la Realme*, or, *ſinon per common conſent de Parliement*. Some preſidents, or matters of fact appeare, wherein ſome Kings have divers times invaded this right of the ſubject, but upon conference had with the Judges, or petition in Parliament, redreſſe was ever made, and the ſubjects right re-eſta bliſhed. All the colour which can be brought to answer the Law in our caſe, is, that the words of the law are generall Taxes and Tollages, but doe not by ſpecial mention reſtrain extraordinary impositions, in time of extraordinary danger. But wee know the Petition of Right, 3. Car. is grounded upon former Statutes, and recites divers of them, and is a cleare affirance of the common right of England; and yer by that the commiſſions for Loanes were damned: and it is evident that thoſe Loanes were demanded for the generall

generall defence of the Kingdome in time of imminent danger ; and by the same Statute , not onely Loanes, but all other levies of money upon what pretence of danger soever, *Si non per common consent*, are condemned as illegall, and contrary to the Lawes and Rights of *England*. Two things therefore are objected against Parliaments: First, that they are of slow motion, and so most of the Iudges alledge. Secondly, that they may be perverse, and refuse due aid to the King, and so I. *Crawley* boldly suggests. For answer wee say in generall: First, that it is the wisdom of Kings to bee alwayes vigilant, and to have their eyes so open upon forraigne *Princes*, and to maintaine such intelligence that no preparation from abroad may surprize them before recourse had to Parliament ; and this is very easie to insular *Princes*, who have a competent strength of shipping, Secondly, to have alwayes in readinesse against all sudden surprizes, a sufficient store of ammunition and arms both for sea and land-service: and the revenues of the Crowne of England are sufficient for this purpose, and have beene held more then sufficient in former times, when hostility was greater, and the Kingdome smaller. Thirdly, to seeke advise and assistance from Parliaments, frequently in times of quier,

as well as of danger, as well when warre is but smoaking, or kindling, as when it is blown into a flame. Before the conquest this was held policie, and since in *Edward* the thirds time, a statute past to this purpose; and if *parliaments* of late bee growne into dislike, it is not because their vertue is decayd, it is because the corruption of the times cannot endure such sharpe remedies. Fourthly, to speake particularly of this case of ship-money, wee say that it is a course more slow then by *parliament*: there was more expedition used in *parliament* to supply King *Charles*, since hee came to the *Crowne*, then can this way. And wee say moreover, that as the extremity of the Kingdome was when ship-money was demanded, whatsoever was pretended to the contrary, a *parliament* might have beene timely enough called, and seasonably enough supplied the King. As to the second objection of *I. Crawly*, too unfit to come out of any honest wise mans mouth, but much more for a Iudges, Iudge *Crooke* replies, that as there is *nulium iniquum in Lege*, so neither in *parlamento*. The three noted factions which are adverse to *Parliaments*, are the papists, the prelates, and Court parasites; and these may bee therefore supposed to hate *parliaments*, because they knowe themselves hatefull to *parliaments*.

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It is scarce possible for the King to finde out any other that thinkes ill of *Parliaments*, or is ill thought of by *Parliaments*. Of *Papists* little neede to bee said, their enmity is confest, they have little to pretend for themselves, but that *parliaments* are growne puritannicall. The prelates thinke themselves not to have jurisdiction and power enough, and they knowe that *Parliaments* thinke they have too much, and abuse that which they have much more: therefore to uphold themselves, and to crush their ill-willers, they not only tax *Parliaments* of puritanisme, but all puritans of sedition: as much as in them lies, they wed the King to their quarrell, perswading him that *Parliaments* out of puritanisme, do not so much aime at the fall of *Episcopacie*, as *Monarchy*, and that *Episcopacie* is the support of *Monarchy*, so that both must stand and fall together. Howbeit because they cannot upbraide *Parliaments* of attempting any thing against *Monarchy* further then to mainetaine due liberty, therefore they preach an unlimited prerogative, and condemne all law of liberty as injurious to Kings, and incompatible with *Monarchy*. *Manwarring* denies *Parliamentary* power and honour, *Cowell* denies propriety of goods, further then at

the Kings discretion , and *Harrison* accuses Iudge *Hutton* of delivering law against Gods Law , in the case of Ship-money. And the common Court doctrine is, that Kings are boundlesse in authority, and that they onely are *Cesars* friends which justifie that doctrine ; and from this doctrine hath growne all the jealousies of late betweene the King and his best subjects ; and this is that venomous matter which hath laien burning, and ulcerating inwardly in the bowels of the common-wealth so long. The other enemies of Parliaments , are Court dependants, and projectors,, which have taken advantage of this unnaturall dissention berwixt the King and his Subjects ; and have found out meanes to live upon the spoile of both , by siding with the King, and beeing instruments to extend his prerogative to the purchasing of preferment to themselves , disaffection to the King , and vexation to the common-wealth: These three factions excepted , and some few Courtiers which are carryed with the current of example , or are left to speake unpleasing truerths , there is scarce any man in all the Kings dominions , which doth not wish for parliaments , as the States best physick, nay almost as its naturall necessary

cessary food : but I will instance in three things wherein parliaments excell all other Councells whatsoever.

1. *For wisdom, no advice can bee given so prudent, so profound, so universally comprehending, from any other author; it is truly sayd by Sir Robert Cotten, that all private single persons may deceive and bee deceived; but all cannot deceive one, nor one all.*

That an inconsiderable number of Privy-counsellors should see or knowe more then whole Kingdomes, is incredible: vox populi was ever revered as vox Dei, and Parliaments are infallible, and their acts indisputable to all but Parliaments. It is a just law, that no private man must bee wiser then Law publicly made. Our wisest Kings in England, have ever most relied upon the wisdom of Parliaments.

Secondly, no advice can bee so faithfull, so loyall, so religious and sincere, as that which proceeds from parliaments, where so many are gathered together for Gods service in such a devout manner, we cannot but expect that God should bee amongst them: and as they have a more especial blessing promised them; so their ends cannot bee so sinister: private men may thrive

by alterations : and common calamities, but the common body can effect nothing but the common good, because nothing else can bee commodious for them.

Sir Robert Cotton in the life of Henry the third, according to the Court Doctrine at this present, saies, that in Parliament Kings are ever lesse then they should be, and the people more. If this bee spoken of irregular Kings, which will endure to heare of nothing but prerogative government, it may cary some semblance of trueth: but sure is is, good and wise Kings are ever greatest when they sit immured, as it were, in that honourable Assembly: as the Historie of Queene Elizabeth and many of her progenitors testifies. Tis true, K. Henry the third, met with divers oppositions in Parliament : Hee was there upbrayded, and called dilapidator regni; it was true that hee was so, and the most unworthy of rule that ever sate sate in this Throne; yet those words became not subjects : I doe not justify, but in some part extenuate such wisdoms ; for the chiefe blame of those times is not to bee throwne upon the peeres and commons, but upon the King and his out-landish parasites. It is without all question also that in those bloody unjust times, had it not beene for frequent parliaments

ments, and that soveraign remedy which thereby was applied to the bleeding wounds of the Kingdome, no other helpe could have stanchd them.

Even then, when Parliaments were most prevalent, and when they had so much provocation from so variable an uncapable a Prince, they did not seeke to conditionate prerogative, or to depresse Monarchy for the future, though they were a little to injurious to him in person for the present.

Since that time also many Parliaments have had to struggle for due liberty with insolent princes, and have had power to clip the wings of Royalty; and the custome of all Europe almost besides hath seemed to give such countenance to such attempts; but the deepe wisdom, & inviolable loyalty of Parliaments to this composition of government hath bin such, that they never made any invasion upon it. As it was in all former ages, so it now remaines intire with all its glorious ensignes of honour, and all the complements of power, and may bee as odious which seekes too alter or diminish Monarchicall government for the future, as he which seekes to make it infinite, and slanders Parliaments as enemies to it, or endeavors to blow such jealousies into the Kings eares.

3. No advice can bee so fit, so forcible, so effectuall for the publicke welfare, as that which is given in Parliament : if any Cabinet Counsellours could give as wise sincere advice as Parliaments, yet it could not bee so profitable, because the hearts of the people doe not goe along with any other, as with that.

That King which is potent in Parliament, as any good King may, is as it were so inskonfed in the hearts of his subjects, that he is almost beyond the trayns or aimes of treason and rebellion at home, nay forraign hostility cannot peirce him, but through the sides of all his people.

It ought to bee noted also, that the English have ever beene the most devoted servants coequall, sweetly-moderate Sovereignty; so in our English Parliaments, where the Nobility is not too prevalent, as in *Denmark*, nor the Comminalty, as in the Netherlands, nor the King, as in *France*, Justice and policie kisse and embrace more lovingly then elsewhere. And as all the three States have alwayes more harmoniously borne their just proportionable parts in England then elsewhere, so now in these times, in these learned, knowing, religious times, we may expect more blessed counsell from Parliaments then

then ever we received heretofore. May it
 therefore sinke into the heart of our King to
 adhere to Parliaments, and to abhorre the
 grosse delusive suggestions of such as dispa-
 rage that kinde of Councell. May he rather
 confide in that Community which can have
 no other end but their owne happinesse in his
 greatnesse, then in Papists, Prelates, and Pro-
 jectors, to whom the publicke disunion is ad-
 vantageous. May he affect that gentle Pre-
 rogative which stands with the happinesse,
 freedome, and riches of his people; and not
 that terrible Scepter which does as much a-
 vert the hearts, as it doth debilitate the hands,
 and exhaust the purses of his Subjects. May
 he at last learn by experience, that the grie-
 vance of all grievances; that that mischief
 which makes all mischiefs irretrievable;
 and almost hopelesse in England at this day,
 is that Parliaments are clouded, and disguised,
 and suffered to be triumphed by the ill bo-
 ding incendiaries of our State. May it lastly
 enter into his beleefe, that it is impossible for
 any Kingdome to deny publicke assent for
 their Princes; whether in Parliament or out,
 when publicke danger is truly imminent, and
 when it is fairly required; and not by pro-
 jects extorted: that no Nation can unnatu-
 rally seeke its owne ruine; but that all Kings,
 like *Constantino*; may make their Subjects
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purſes their owne private coffers, if they will demand due things, at due times, and by due meanes.

4. I come now to the laſt difficulty, about the condition and nature of ſuch aydes as are due by Law from the Subject to the King. Though much have beene argued both at the barre and on the Bench, for the King, that he may raiſe moneyes from his Subjects, without conſent by Law, Prerogative, and neceſſity. Yet at laſt, becauſe the Petition of Right abſolutely croſſes this tenet, it is reſtored to us backe againe, and yeelded, that the King may not impoſe a pecuniary charge by way of Tollage, but onely a perſonall one by way of ſervice. And now all our controverſie ends in this, that we muſt conteſt, whether the Ship-ſcot be a pecuniary, or a perſonall charge. : For though the intent of the Writ, and the office of the Sheriffe be to raiſe moneyes onely, yet the words of the Writ, and the pretence of State, is to build and prepare Ships of warre. The Kingdome generally takes this to be a nicere deluſion and impoſture, and doubtleſſe it is but a picklock trick, to overthrow all liberty and propriety of goods, and it is a great ſhame that ſo many Judges ſhould be abettors to ſuch fraudulent practice contrived againſt the State. It is not lawfull for the King to demand moneyes

neyes as moneyes, but it is lawfull to demand moneyes under another wrong name ; and under this wrong name all former Lawes and Liberties shall be as absolutely cancelled, as if they had beene meere cobwebs, or enacted onely out of meere derision! If former lawes made to guard propriety of goods were just, and grounded upon good reason, why are they by this grosse fallacie, or childish abuse defeated. If they were not just, or reasonable, what needes such a fond subtiltie as this? why should they not be fairely avoided by Law? Why were they made at all? But be this invention what it will, yet we see it is new; if it be quashed, the State is but where it was, we are still as our Ancestors left us; and since our preceeding Kings never heretofore put it in use in the most necessitous calamitous times, we may from hence inferre, that the plea of State necessity falls off of it selfe; if we admit not of this innovation, then the State suffers not; but if we admit it, no necessity being of it, we can frame no other reason for our so doing, but that our former franchises and priviledges were unjust, and therefore this way they must be annulled. Some of our Judges doe prove, that if this were a personall service, yet it were void; and they cite the case of Barges, and Ballin-

gers vessells, built truly for Warre in time of imminent danger, and yet these charges upon complaint made by the Subject, were revoked, and disclaimed. But here in this case many other enormities and defects in Law Lare, for if ships be intended to be built in Inland Countries, a thing impossible is injoyned; and if *moneyes* be aimed at, that very ayne is against Law: and if the Kingdome were to be disfranchised, it were not to be done by an illegall way.

Besides, in the Writ, in the *Assessment*, in the *Sheriffes* remedy against *Recusants* of it, in the execution of Law, by, or after judgment, many inconveniences, errors, and mischiefs arise many wayes: and sure take the whole case as it is, and since the Creation no whole Kingdome was ever cast in such a cause before.

Besides, though the *Judges* ought wholly to have bent themselves upon this, to have proved this a personall service, and no pecuniary charge, they have roved after necessity, presumption of Law, and Prerogative, and scarce said any thing at all hereof.

My Lord *Bramston* argues very eagerly, that personall services by Sea and Land are due to the King in cases of extremity, and all their records, cases, and presidents prove no more,

more, and that men may be arrayed, and ships pressed, and that *sumptibus populi*; but there is nothing proved that the meere raising of moneyes in this case, is a personall service.

I. Jones indeed argues to this purpose: If the Law intrust the King with so great a power over mens persons, why not over their estates? There is cleare reason for the contrary: because the King, if he should abuse mens personall aides, could not enrich or profit himselfe thereby, and we know it is gaine and profit, it is *Auri sacra fames* which hath power over the breasts of men. It is not ordinary for Tyrants to imbattaile hoasts of men, and make them charge upon the Seabillowes, and then to gather up Cockles and Piwinckle shells in lieu of spoile, as one did once: but the World abounds with stories of such Princes, as have offended in abusing their power over mens estates, and have violated all right divine and humane, to attaine to such a boundlesse power.

Good Kings are sometimes weake in coveting boundlesse power; some affect rivalry with God himselfe in power, and yet places that power in doing evill, not good: for few Kings want power to doe good, and therefore it misbecomes not sometimes good Subjects to be jealous in some things of good

Kings. But J. *Jones* farther sayes, that Ships must be built, and without money that cannot be done : *ergo*. This necessity hath beene answered, and disproved already : and I now adde, that for the good of the Kingdome there is more necessity that Ship-money be damned then maintained. Such unnaturall slavery seemes to mee to be attendant upon this all-devouring project, and such infamy to our Ancestors, our Lawes, and our selves, nay, and such danger to the King and his posterity, that I cannot imagine how any forraigne conquest should induce any thing more to be detested and abhorred.

Those Kings which have beene most covetous of unconfined immoderate power, have beene the weakest in judgment, and commonly their lives have beene poore and toylsome, and their ends miserable, and violent : so that if Kings did rightly understand their owne good, none would more shunne uncontrollable absolutenesse then themselves.

How is the King of *France* happy in his great *Prerogative* ? or in that terrible stile of the King of *Asses* ? we see that his immoderate power makes him oppresse, his poore *Pesants*, for their condition is most deplorable, and yet set his power aside, and there

there is no reason why he should not be as a Father to cherish them, as a God to comfort them, not as an enemy to impoverish them, as a tormentor to afflict them.

2. His oppression makes him culpable before God : he must one day render a sad account for all the evill which he hath imposed, for all the good which he hath not procured to them. That the Vicegerent of God should doe the office of a tyrant, will be no light thing one day.

3. His sinne makes him poote : for were his Pefants suffered to get wealth and enjoy it, the whole Land would be his treasury, and that treasury would containe twice as much as now it doth.

4. His poverty makes him impotent, for money being the sinewes of warre, how strong would his joynts be, if all his subjects were abounding in money, as doubtlesse they would, if they wanted not liberty, and propriety & besides, poverty depresses the spirit of a Nation : and were the King of France, King of an Infanterie, as he is onely of a Cavalrie, were he a King of men, as he is onely of beasts, had he a power over hearts as he hath over hands, that Country would be twice as puissant as it is.

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5. His impotence together with all other irregularities, and abuses is like to make his Monarchy the lesse durable. Civill wars have ever hitherto infected and maderated that goodly Countrey, and many times it hath been near it's ruine: it now enjoyes inward peace, but it doth no great exploits abroad, nor is ever likely to doe, unlesse by practising upon the distemper of other Nations: should some other Prince practise in the like manner upon that, and propose liberty to the griev'd people, much advantage might be taken: but these avisoes would better proceed from that most heroick, most terrible, most armipotent Churchman, which effects such great wonders here: wee see hence that Princes by some gaine lose, as the whole body pines by the swelling of the spleene: we see that *Rehoboam* catcht an immoderate power, as the Dog in the fable at a shadow, but in stead of an uncertain nothing, he let fall and lost a certaine substance; and yet flatterers have scarce any other baite then this shadow of immoderate power, whereby to poison the phantasies of weak humours, undiscerning rash Princes.

My humble motion therefore is First, that the judgement given in the Chequer Cham-

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ber for Ship-money, may bee reversed; and damned, as contrary to the right of the Subject.

Secondly, that those Iudges which adhered to equity and integrity in this case, might have some honourable guerdon designed them.

Thirdly, that some dishonourable penalty may bee imposed upon those Iudges which ill advised the King herein, and then argued as Pleaders, not as Iudges; especially if any shall appeare to have solicited the betraying of the Kingdome.

Fourthly, that the meaning of our Lawes & Charters, may bee fully and expressly declared, and the force and vertue of Statutes and publicke Grants, may be vindicated from all such exceptions and objections as have beene particularly or generally made against them.

Fifthly, that a clearer solution may be given in the foure maine points stirred, how farre prerogative is arbitrary and above Law; and how farre naturall Allegiance bindes to yeeld to all demands, not of Parliament: next, how the King is sole Judge of danger, as that his meere cognizance thereof shall be sufficient, though there be no appearance or probability thereof. Next, how a necessity

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of publicke mine must be concluded now, if Ship-money be not levied, when no such ruine hath been formerly, when this new plot was not devised. Lastly, how this Ship-scoot pretending ships, but intending money, and really raising the same, can be said to be no pecuniary tollage within our Statutes, but a meere personall service.

Sixthly, that any Officers, or Ministers of State, which shall attempt to lay the like taxes hereafter upon the Subject, by vertue of the like void warrants, may be held and taken as Felons, or Traytors, or forcible Intruders.

Seventhly, that something may be enacted against forraigne and domesticall Forces also, if they shall be congregated for the like purposes; and that the subject may be inabled by some fit and timely remedy to be given against a military kinde of government.

Eighthly, that the due way of publicke defence, in case of imminent and eminent danger, or actuall necessary warre, for the pressing of men, and other charges of warre, such as Core and Conduet money, and all doubts thereabouts, may be made more certaine, and settled for the time to come.

Ninthly, that if the Kings ordinary Revenues now taken for the Crowne, be not sufficient

cient to maintaine him, as our great Master,
 some legall order may be taken therefore, and
 that he may be sensible of his Subjects loy-
 alty, and his Subjects live safe under him,
 that his enemies may finde him considerable,
 and his true friends usefull.

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clear to manifest him, as our great Master
some day will order may be taken therefore and
that is why the people of his Subjects love
him, and his Subjects live in order him,
and his enemies may have him comfortable
and his true friends will.

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